Baby Boomer Foreign Affairs: A Critical Assessment

This article is dedicated to Capt. Christopher “Tripp” Zanetis, who died in Iraq during combat operations on March 15, 2018.

The Constitution defines Government’s mandate in foreign affairs: ensure the American people’s safety, prosperity, and liberty. U.S. foreign policy from 1945-1990 contributed to those goals. American policy was so successful that President Clinton’s December 1999 national security strategy noted that “America [was] at the height of its influence.” Today, however, the American people are less safe, less prosperous, and less free than they were. What happened?

As the 25-year Baby Boomer reign enters its final act, Millennials and Gen-X should assess the contexts, challenges, policies, and implementation of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations (spoiler alert: they all get participation trophies). We should draw lessons for ourselves as we prepare to lead during what may be a turbulent period in the Republic’s history.

The Clinton Administration: Strategic Drift

The Clinton Administration’s policy context was the strategic drift caused by the Soviet Union’s downfall. The absence of America’s primary adversary presented the Clinton Administration with two dilemmas. First, the Administration needed to justify continued global leadership to an isolationist-inclined public. Second, without an organizing principle, the Administration struggled to prioritize its goals.

America’s strategic drift did not reflect a lack of challenges. The Clinton Administration grappled with arms control and non-proliferation, a no-fly zone, a near-war on the Korean peninsula, genocide in Europe and Africa, economic threats posed by new information technology’s application to economic espionage, and Islamist terrorist attacks. Compared to the Soviet menace, however, America faced little resistance to its dominance.

The Clinton Administration’s policy response arrested America’s strategic drift. During a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake promulgated the policy of enlargement. The policy advocated for expanding free market democracies and supported NATO’s expansion. To signal the continued requirement for American leadership and create a framework for prioritizing goals, the Clinton Administration expanded the definition of America’s interests to include vital interests, important national interests such as economics and trade, and humanitarian and other interests.

Implementation focused on multilateral diplomatic and economic tools—military power was less emphasized. In response to civil war in Somalia and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, the Clinton Administration resisted the temptation to deepen U.S. military involvement. Where it did engage militarily, the Administration made certain that it operated within an international framework (e.g., in 1999, the United States led a NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia). Economically, the Clinton Administration negotiated new free trade agreements: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade, and passed legislation outlawing economic espionage. Diplomatically, the Clinton Administration pursued START II, the NATO-Russia founding act, a joint U.S.-Russia launch of the International Space Station, and an attempt to broker Middle East peace.

By 2001, the American people faced no major threats. America’s economy was booming. Federal spending was reduced and diverted to domestic priorities. Finally, the American people’s liberty was so secure that the public began to take it for granted. However, the Clinton Administration’s foreign policies were questionably relevant to these outcomes.

There are three lessons from the Administration’s foreign policy. First, action is not always better than inaction. The opportunities presented by the Soviet’s downfall enticed action; however, NATO’s expansion into the former Soviet bloc carried longer-term risk. Today, Moscow justifies its aggression as a response to NATO’s expansion into its near-abroad (the issue is hotly debated). Second, prudence is a virtue. Critics lambasted the Administration for withdrawing from Somalia and failing to act in Rwanda. However, the application of American military power in the absence of clear objectives and legal basis would risk overextension, mission creep, and drain resources. Third, everything cannot be a priority. The Administration focused limited resources on a range of issues. The application of too-few resources on too many issues may have contributed to the failure of U.S. intelligence to detect a deadly terrorist threat.

The Bush Administration – GWOT as Grand Strategy

The Bush Administration’s policy context was the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attacks halted America’s strategic drift. For the first time since the Cold War, Americans wondered whether they were safe. Partisan politics of the 1990s and the 2000 presidential election fell away and the American people united briefly. Internationally, nations condemned terrorism. NATO made ready for war in Afghanistan. Traditional foes such as Russia, Iran, and Libya offered support or placation.

The Bush Administration’s strategic challenge was rebuilding a capability to respond to an unknown threat. The Americans did not understand the terrorists’ plans, capabilities, and intentions. Further, they did not understand to the extent to which terrorist groups received weaponry, financial assistance, or material support from hostile nation-states. As a result, the Administration could not anticipate what further attacks were on the horizon.

The Bush Administration’s response declared war on terror and shaped its policy around a confrontation between good and evil. Anyone not “with us” was “against us.” Fearful of another attack, America’s leaders resolved to address terror’s underlying cause and implemented the Freedom Agenda. A congressional majority authorized military action against Saddam Hussein. America determined to bring democracy to the Middle East.

Implementation emphasized military action. Counterterrorism substituted for grand strategy. Political strategy and diplomacy were deemphasized (the United States withdrew from the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol). The Congress increased resources significantly and made reforms to intelligence sharing and coordination. The Administration adapted circumspect intelligence and detention practices. Finally, the Congress expanded the government’s authority to collect information on threats and debated a domestic intelligence agency.

The Administration did not forsake completely the non-military instruments of power. America established the Proliferation Security Initiative and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. It negotiated new trade agreements, including the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). In Afghanistan and to a lesser extent, Iraq, it built Coalitions to support stability operations, police and military training, and civil society engagements.

In retrospect, the Bush Administration did not advance America’s safety, prosperity, and liberty. Osama bin Laden was still at large and two wars cost many lives and nearly $5 trillion. Economically, government spending grew and a crash in the U.S. real estate market precipitated the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. Finally, the American public stopped taking liberties for granted. Voters asked whether government exceeded legal limits in intelligence, surveillance, and detention activities.

There are three lessons from the Bush Administration. First, prioritization was key to success. The counterterrorism priority brought policy attention and resources that built a formidable capability. Second, policymakers should set objectives within constitutionally-prescribed goals. In a misguided effort to solve Islamist terrorism, the Administration tried to bring about democracy using the military instrument of power. As such action is not a constitutionally-prescribed goal, the Republicans lost the 2006 mid-term elections and eventually the presidency to an anti-war candidate (President Obama). Finally, hubris and emotion must be avoided. America's relative power and righteous anger let it to overreach. Overreach destroys empires.

The Obama Administration – Naïve Reset

The Obama Administration’s context was its perceived need to reset America’s foreign relations (e.g., by closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility). President Obama repudiated President Bush’s perceived unilateralism during his 2009 inaugural address:

“[Earlier generations] understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”

Partisanship reached fevered pitch as rivals and critics accused the Administration of undertaking an “apology” tour.

The Administration’s strategic challenges included a number of inherited and unforeseen crises. It inherited a strong CT capability but Osama bin Laden was at large. It also inherited two wars, a financial crash, and growing tensions with Russia and China. The Administration grappled the war in Libya, the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, Israel’s reaction to Iranian nuclear capabilities, a failed reset with Russia and Russia’s annexing of Crimea, China’s building man-made islands in contested international waters, and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 2001-era domestic political consensus evaporated and complicated America’s ability to respond. Financially, the Congress enacted the Budget Control Act of 2011 and reduced national security spending.

The Obama Administration’s policy response reduced the ambition of U.S. strategic objectives. Washington redoubled its focus on the “war of necessity” in Afghanistan while drawing down U.S. forces from the “war of choice” in Iraq. It put public timelines on both conflicts. It focused on building local forces while reducing its own requirements. Unilateral actions were limited to attacks against high-value targets such as Osama bin Laden. The Administration saw America’s future in the Asia-Pacific and shifted focus from the Middle East. However, as each crisis generated novel dilemmas, trade-offs, and pressures, the Administration’s decision-making became gridlocked.

Implementation emphasized diplomacy. The Administration accepted risk in the timeliness of achieving its objectives by working “by, with, and through” local security partners. It negotiated temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, normalized relations with Myanmar and Cuba, negotiated the Paris climate accords, and a pursued a failed Middle East peace process It failed to prevent North Korea’s nuclearization, maintain America’s long-standing partnership with Egypt, and resolve the Syrian civil war. Economically, the Administration implemented strong sanctions against Iran, negotiated the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), and sanctioned Russia. Militarily, the Administration built an international Coalition to counter ISIS, enabled Europe’s military intervention in Libya, and provided limited assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen. It also authorized freedom of navigation operations in contested waters of the South China Sea and sold arms to Taiwan.

The Administration’s results were mixed. Like the Bush Administration, the Obama team overreached with its preferred instrument of power: diplomacy. When diplomacy was not underwritten by a credible threat, foreign powers viewed the United States as feckless. Still, by 2016, the organized terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland was eradicated. The Iranian nuclear program was curbed. After withdrawing from Iraq, the Administration redeployed and pushed back ISIS from its physical caliphate. Libya remained a source of instability. Tensions grew with Russia and China. America’s prosperity was returning, though the economy lagged. Finally, the debate over civil liberties intensified as partisanship increased and accusations of Russian meddling in the U.S. presidential election came to the fore.

There are three primary lessons from the Obama Administration. First, persuasion and political strategy are cost-effective instruments of power. In 2009, the Obama Administration’s no-conditions outreach to Iran prompted a politically-costly public rejection. However, Iran’s rejection painted Obama as the reasonable actor. Coupled with provocative Iranian rhetoric, the Administration parried Iranian actions to rally the world in crippling Iran’s economy. Second, geography is essential. Turkey reminded Washington of geography when it let refugees flow into Europe in response to Washington’s working with the Syrian Kurds. The resulting pressures created a wave of new political parties that are threatening European democracy. Finally, American deterrence begins and ends in the White House. Washington’s failure to enforce its Syria red-line diminished its credibility. Iranian influence expanded. Russia deepened its influence in the Middle East. China increased its aggressive actions in disputed territory waters.

Strategic Assessment

U.S. foreign policy over the past 25 years has been a disaster. The United States stumbled after goals well beyond government’s constitutional mandate. It used the instruments of power in an unbalanced way and lurched from strategic drift to militarism to feckless diplomacy. Moreover, America failed to anticipate 9/11. Then, it overreacted by invading two countries. Finally, America then over-learned that lesson and the resulting timidity invited aggression everywhere. The world is far more dangerous as a result. As the risk of catastrophic global war grows, statesmen and stateswomen are rare in Washington.

Threat Picture

Looking forward, the United States faces intensifying competition from nation-state actors. Russia and China seek to revise the U.S.-led international order. North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile operations menace international peace. Iran’s unchecked expansion risks provoking a new regional war. The Middle East’s civil wars provide opportunities for terror recruitment and safe-havens and undermine a lasting defeat for ISIS. The wars’ resulting refugee flows destabilize neighboring countries and pressure western democracies with complex social and political challenges. Finally, the U.S. trade deficit remains high and partisan politics undermine meaningful dialogue on climate issues.

America’s allies are also responding. With uncertain American leadership, Europe hastened to implement the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF)— moves that threaten the transatlantic alliance. Saudi Arabia led its Coalition to stalemate in Yemen and isolated Qatar. Turkey’s operations in Syria risks the ISIS campaign. South Korea advances an uncoordinated diplomatic track with North Korea. All of these developments generate new escalation risks.

Charting a New Course

It took America 25 years to damage its standing in the world, so charting a new course will likewise be a generational undertaking. It begins with us—Millennials and Gen X—revisiting our strategic thinking and learning lessons from our predecessors. We should seek to align ends, ways, and means within constitutionally-prescribed goals. We might improve our arts of persuasion and political strategy. We should account for the “permanent things” of human nature and history (and, I would add geography) in our calculations. We should abandon partisan ideology and replace it with Roman virtue (energetic manliness, piety toward ancestors, family, and country, and prudence). We must drop the arrogant belief that all problems have American solutions and all opportunities should be acted upon. Finally, we distinguish between interests and preferences and adjust our policy appetites accordingly.

We also need institutional reform. The national security enterprise is ill-equipped to respond to nation-state competitors. Our generation should look to reform the 1947 National Security Act. Other than special interests, few benefit from the behemoth bureaucracy we have today: a Department of Homeland Security with 22 subordinate agencies; a Director of National Intelligence with 17 subordinate agencies, a Department of Justice comprised of multiple enforcement agencies, and a Department of Defense comprised of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, three military departments, four military services (possibly five services someday), 10 combatant commands, the National Guard Bureau, and dozens of agencies and field activities. Leaders should set a goal for America’s military to become twice as lethal at half the cost (if the Congress was wise, it would allocate the other half of that budget to NASA so that it might tackle some of the real long-term threats to safety, prosperity, and liberty).

Finally, future leaders must drive social reform. We must strengthen a just domestic order through bold steps in campaign finance and gerrymandering reform. We should lead public opinion and debate away from platitudes to, as Secretary Mattis demands, defining problems to “a Jesuit’s level of satisfaction.” Last, we must educate ourselves in history (especially of antiquity), civic virtue, and the millennia-long evolution of western civilization from Jerusalem, to Athens, Rome, London, and, finally, to Philadelphia, that produced America’s constitutional republican order. If we act upon these lessons over the next decade, America will strengthen and preserve itself for posterity. If we fail, we will not earn us a participation trophy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.